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I.  Introduction
Once hailed as a successful model of liberaleconomic reform, Argentina’s economy, andconsequently the welfare of millions of
people and numerous nations, exists in a precarious
state, teetering on the brink of total collapse.  A se-
vere recession has plagued the Argentine economy
since 1998, and signs indicate that the economy will
continue to experience a particularly rapid decline this
year.  Unemployment has climbed to 25%, causing
the country’s once relatively large middle class, to
shrink.  Over 44% of the population now subsists
below the poverty line, and this number continues to
grow.  Forecasts project that
GDP will plummet between
5% and 10% for 2002.  Ar-
gentina recently defaulted on
its $155 billion debt, which rep-
resents the largest single debt
default in the entire world (“A
Decline without Parallel,”
2002).  The Argentine bank-
ing system is in danger of col-
lapsing and can only hope to survive with the aid of
strong government intervention.  Deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions forced Argentina to abandon its
decade-old fixed exchange rate with the dollar and
devalue the peso.
Considering Argentina qualified as one of the
ten richest countries in the world with living standards
that rivaled France and Germany less than a century
ago, one must wonder how the Argentine economy
plummeted to its current dismal state (“A Decline with-
out Parallel,” 2002).   Although no single policy or
event can be identified as the sole culprit of Argentina’s
deterioration, a few factors clearly undermined eco-
nomic stability and precipitated Argentina’s demise.
Both loose fiscal policy, involving massive budget
deficits and a fixed exchange rate pegged to the dol-
lar at par contributed to the catastrophic collapse of
Latin America’s second largest economy and richest
nation.
This paper asserts that while Argentina’s fixed
exchange rate provided short-term economic stabil-
ity, it laid the foundation of the economy’s current
collapse.  A fixed exchange rate or dollarization may
represent a short-term solution to rampant hyperin-
flation, but it is not a long term, sustainable remedy to
fundamental economic problems.  Argentina’s eco-
nomic policy sacrificed the long-
term interest of a country in fa-
vor of immediate, short-term
benefits.
This paper develops as fol-
lows:  Section II briefly
chronicles Argentina’s recent
economic history, focusing on its
economic condition and policies
during the late 1980’s and early
1990’s, which prompt the implementation of a fixed
exchange rate.  Section III utilizes formal economic
theory, including exchange rate models and the AS-
AD model, in order to analyze the effects of
Argentina’s fixed exchange rate.  Section IV discusses
and reviews the conclusions of other economic re-
search conducted on pegged exchange rates.  Sec-
tion V examines empirical evidence regarding the ef-
fects of the pegged exchange rate on various Argen-
tine economic variables.  Section VI concludes with
a concise summary of the shortcomings of fixed ex-
change rates, and then offers a brief discussion of
Argentina’s options for the future.
“Considering Argentina quali-
fied as one of the ten richest countries
in the world with living standards
that rivaled France and Germany less
than a century ago, one must wonder
how the Argentine economy plum-
meted to its current dismal state.”
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II. Overview of Agentina’s Recent Economic
History
The 1980’s represented a very volatile pe-
riod for the Argentine economy, which creates the
desire, and perhaps even a need for an exchange rate
pegged at par to the dollar.  The country endured two
severe bouts with hyperinflation during which infla-
tion skyrocketed into the quadruple digits on several
occasions.  This exponentially increasing inflation,
which reached 3,066% in 1989, imposed serious costs
upon households and businesses (Cooper, 2001).
Some businesses closed their doors, posting signs stat-
ing “We have no prices,” because they could not ac-
curately predict and mark up prices quickly enough
(Anderson, 1999).  Employees demanded frequent
payment, and then quickly spent or converted their
wages.  Both businesses and households reduced
currency holdings, and the US dollar served as the
preferred medium of exchange and store of value
(Cardoso, 1992).  Both domestic and foreign invest-
ment plunged, and capital flight occurred.  Large gov-
ernment deficits, which occurred in the absence of
investment, further encouraged inflation.  Prices failed
to serve as signals for resource allocation and there-
fore, market forces could not reach an efficient out-
come.  As a result, productivity decreased, and GDP
dropped 4% in 1990 (“A Decline without Parallel,”
2002).  The diminishing productivity capabilities of
Argentina as well as the minimal consumer and inves-
tor confidence contributed to two severe recessions
in the 1980’s, and unemployment afflicted a quarter
of the population.  The combined effect of high infla-
tion with high unemployment, a phenomenon known
as stagflation, crippled the Argentine economy.
In order to combat hyperinflation and pro-
mote economic growth, Carlos Menem, the former
President of Argentina, and his economic minister,
Domingo Cavallo, created the Currency Board in
1991, which became the cornerstone for the revival
of the Argentine economy.  The Currency Board
pegged the Argentine peso to the US dollar at a one-
to-one ratio by law, known as the Convertibility Law
(Allen, 2002).  The Currency Board supported this
fixed exchange rate by accumulating US dollars and
other strong foreign currencies in its reserve.  Fixing
the exchange rate immediately halts inflation and re-
stores economic growth.  However, the fixed exchange
rate creates the origins of future economic problems.
The following models explain how Argentina’s fixed
exchange rate created short-term economic stability
and prosperity and how it eventually contributed to
the economy’s recent demise.
III. Formal Model
Nominal exchange rates, which are generally
market-determined, measure the price of one cur-
rency in terms of another.  The nominal exchange rate
changes in the short run as the real exchange rate,
domestic inflation, or foreign inflation varies.  Inflation
will cause depreciation, thus reducing the purchasing
power of that currency, which reflects the Argentine
economy during the 1980’s.  All other factors held
constant, hyperinflation will cause a large upward shift
in the Argentine expected return curve, because infla-
tion erodes purchasing power, creating depreciation.
This effect is depicted in the shift from R (A) curve to
R1(A). The US expected return curve will experi-
ence a small leftward shift as seen in the movement
from I (US) to I1(US) due to the higher nominal in-
terest rates in Argentina that make Argentine financial
assets more attractive.  However, the first effect domi-
nates, and hyperinflation will cause the peso to de-
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Figure 1: Inflation and Exchange Rate
preciate against the dollar, as seen in figure 1.
Inflation negatively impacts the economy and
will decrease output, which can be seen using the
Aggregate Supply-Aggregate Demand (AS-AD)
model.  Inflation will increase the cost of inputs, which
will cause the short run aggregate supply (SRAS) curve
to shift left, which increases the price level and de-
creases output, as illustrated in figure 2.   In summa-
tion, the hyperinflation of the 1980’s in Argentina
caused the depreciation of the peso, an increase in
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price level and a decrease in output.
A fixed exchange rate occurs when a gov-
ernment sets and maintains the exchange rate at pre-
determined levels.  If an inflation-prone currency, such
as the Argentine peso, is pegged to a stable currency,
such as the US dollar, then the Argentine money sup-
ply will stabilize and inflation will significantly drop.  A
fixed exchange rate prevents excessive money growth,
because the country must maintain the predetermined
convertibility.  As long as US monetary growth is not
excessive, Argentina’s currency will remain stable.
Neither appreciation nor depreciation will occur un-
der a fixed exchange rate.  Figure 3 illustrates the
effects of a fixed exchange rate in terms of the AS-
will fall, while output increases.  The decrease in money
supply will cause the AD curve to shift left, further
decreasing the price level and creating a small de-
crease in output.  As a whole, the Argentine fixed
exchange rate will decrease the price level and in-
crease output.  In addition, a fixed exchange rate will
initially lower domestic interest rates, because both
inflation and inflationary expectations decrease.  Con-
sequently, both domestic and foreign investment will
increase and borrowing/lending by households, firms,
and government will reemerge, thus promoting eco-
nomic growth.  A credible fixed exchange rate will
effectively the eliminate exchange rate risk with re-
spect to the US dollar, which will further promote
foreign investment.
However, a fixed exchange rate must remain
constant despite changing economic conditions.  Over-
valuation often occurs when weak currencies are
pegged to strong currencies.  As a direct result of the
implementation of the fixed exchange rate, the peso
greatly appreciated in order to achieve the one-to-
one convertibility with the US dollar.  If a currency
appreciates, then the country’s exports will become
more expensive and net exports will decrease.  In
addition, a country must relinquish all monetary and
exchange rate policy in favor of the rigidly fixed ex-
change rate.  Consequently, a country with a pegged
exchange rate cannot effectively combat external
shocks.  External shocks to the Argentine economy,
such as Mexico’s financial crisis, the devaluation of
the Brazilian real, the appreciation of the dollar rela-
tive to other currencies, and increasing capital costs
caused the economy to contract and create depre-
ciative pressures upon the peso (“A Decline without
Parallel,” 2002).  In order to combat depreciation
pressures and maintain the fixed exchange rate, the
government will purchase its own currency with dol-
lars and raise interest rates.  Due to increasing inter-
est rates, investment will decrease and capital flight
will occur in expectation of depreciation, which in turn,
decreases credit availability.  The decrease in invest-
ment and net exports will cause AD to shift left, de-
creasing output and lowering the price level as de-
picted in Figure 4.
However, the government cannot devalue the
currency to make its goods more competitive abroad
nor can it use monetary policy to stimulate the
economy.  The government lacks the necessary tools
to effectively manage a recession (Murphy, 2001).
The government may utilize fiscal policy to stimulate
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Figure 3: Fixed Exchange rate in 1991
AD model.
The initial drop in inflation produced by the
fixed exchange rate will decrease the price of inputs,
causing the SRAS curve to shift right and price level
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Figure 2: Hyperinflation and Recession during
1980’s
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the economy, though large government deficits en-
courage inflation, which serves to increase deprecia-
tion pressure (Salma, 1993).  Nonetheless, econo-
mies with fixed exchange rates will experience severe
recessions in response to external shocks.
IV. Previous Research
Both economic theory and case studies clearly
indicate that a fixed exchange rate can effectively elimi-
nate hyperinflation, and thus provide economic sta-
bility and growth in the short run.  Fixed exchange
rates and dollarization help to break the self-perpetu-
ating cycle of hyperinflation, and some economists
view these policies as the only viable solution for many
of the inflation-prone Latin American countries.
Dollarization involves fixing a currency to the US dol-
lar regardless of market influences.  Currency boards
create credibility, which many Latin American coun-
tries lack due to recent histories of hyperinflation
(Salma, 1993). Until recently, many economists ex-
tolled Argentina as the success story of Latin America
and viewed the Argentine currency board as the foun-
dation of the country’s seven years of economic growth
(Murphy, 2001).
According to economic research, small open
economies, heavily dependent upon trade with the
US, will experience the most success from dollarization
or an exchange rate pegged to the dollar.  Examples
of successful dollarization include Ecuador, El Salva-
dor, and Panama (Von Furstenber, 2000).  However,
the Argentine economy is much larger and essentially
a closed economy, considering that consumption rep-
resents 83% of GDP.  Therefore, many economists
viewed the Argentine peg as unsustainable (Ander-
son, 1999).
Historically, larger economies have failed to
maintain fixed exchange rates for more than a de-
cade.  Economists cite the loss of monetary indepen-
dence, which reduces the ability of a country to re-
spond to external shocks, as the primary drawback
of a fixed exchange rate (Gajewski, 2001). In retro-
spect, Argentina’s fixed exchange rate should have
served as an intermediate step to control hyperinfla-
tion.  A fixed exchange rate cannot create long run
economic prosperity nor can it replace healthy mac-
roeconomic policy.  The thesis of this paper, which
asserts that Argentina’s fixed exchange rate under-
mined long run economic welfare for short run ben-
efits, supports these conclusions.
V.  Evidence and Results
Empirical evidence supports the assertion that
a fixed exchange rate can effectively combat hyperin-
flation, thus providing economic stability.  Immedi-
ately following the implementation of the fixed ex-
change rate, inflation plummeted from the quadruple
digits to less than 1% in 1991, which is one of the
lowest rates in the world (Anderson, 1999).  The in-
flation rate averaged around 4% while the peso re-
mained pegged to the dollar during the 1990’s.
Argentina’s pegged exchange rate achieved its pri-
mary goal of immediate price stabilization.
Statistical data also confirms that a fixed ex-
change rate can promote economic growth in the short
run.  During the 1980’s, GDP declined annually at a
rate of 1.1% due to recessions and economic insta-
bility.  Following the implementation of the fixed ex-
change rate, GDP increased 10.6% in 1991 (Ander-
son, 1999).  GDP growth averaged 6.1% from 1991
to 1997, the highest in Latin America, thus securing
seven years of economic growth (“A Decline without
Parallel,” 2002).  The fixed exchange rate promoted
economic growth, because it restored confidence in
the Argentine economy by achieving price stability.
Interest rates fell from 69.2% in ’91 to 6.8% in ’98
(Anderson, 1999).  Lower interest rates and a stable
economy spurred a large increase in both domestic
and foreign investment.  Capital rapidly flowed into
Argentina following the implementation of the fixed
exchange rate, which helped promote economic
growth (Gajewski, 2001).  Productivity also increased
as investment modernized both the industrial and ag-
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Figure 4: Collapse of the Argentine Economy
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ricultural, sectors further increasing GDP.
Argentine economic variables support the
conclusion that a fixed exchange rate can jeopardize
long-term economic welfare.  In order to achieve a
one-to-one convertibility ratio, the peso had to ap-
preciate significantly.  The fixed exchange rate, which
forced the relative appreciation of the peso, caused
Argentine goods to become relatively more expen-
sive abroad due to the peso’s inflated value.  Conse-
quently, net exports decreased from a record trade
surplus of $8.3 billion during 1990 to a deficit just
two years later (“Argentina: History in the Making?”
1992). A decrease in exports hinders the growth of
GDP, which negatively impacted the Argentine
economy.
Although low interest rates helped create economic
growth, low interest rates and newly available credit
allowed the Argentine government to accumulate a
very large debt, totaling $155 billion.  Debt composed
34% of GDP in ’91 and then rose to 51% by ’99.
The large government debt placed a strain upon the
economy, because it consumed a large portion of GDP,
which could have been used to stimulate the economy.
Debt servicing composed 25% of government ex-
penditure and 3% of GDP in ’98 (Anderson, 1999).
In order to maintain the overvalued peso
against depreciation pressures, the government raised
interest rates and purchased its own currency with
dollars.  In addition, the sale of dollars reduced the
central bank international reserves, causing the cause
interest rate to increase and money supply to fall.
Interest rates, which hovered around 6% from 1996
to 2000, rapidly rose to 45% 2001 (Latin Focus,
2002).  Due to increasing interest rates and falling
investor confidence, investment growth rate decreased
from 17.7% in 1997 to –12.6% in 1999 (Latin Fo-
cus, 2002).  Evidence indicates that the one-to-one
peg overvalued the peso.  Although officially one peso
could be exchanged for one dollar, the market sug-
gested otherwise.  The peso interest rate surcharge
of 500 basis points over the dollar casts doubts on
the one-to-one convertibility (Von Furstenber, 2002).
Evidence also indicates that Argentina’s fixed exchange
rate compromised its ability to respond to external
shocks, which caused severe contractions in the Ar-
gentine economy.   As a result of Mexico’s devalua-
tion of the peso, the Argentine economy suffered and
GDP contracted 5% in ‘95.  When Brazil devalued
the real in ‘98, once again, Argentina fell into a reces-
sion (Gajewski, 2001).  Despite large, often irrespon-
sible government investment and expenditures, ag-
gressive expansionary fiscal policy failed to stimulate
the economy.  Since the fixed exchange rate elimi-
nated monetary policy as an option, the government
continued to futilely rely upon ineffective fiscal policy.
Eventually, rapidly deteriorating economic conditions,
forced Argentina to default on its $155 billion debt in
January of 2002, which represents the largest single
default in the world (“A Decline without Parallel,”
2002).
Due to the rapidly deteriorating economic conditions
and the obviously overvalued state of the peso, the
president of Argentina, Eduardo Duhalde devalued
the peso to a 1.4 exchange rate in January of 2002.
Currently, the economy remains in a recession with
unemployment reaching 25%.  Forecasts predict that
the recession will worsen, and GDP will decrease 5%-
10% in 2002 (“A Decline without Parallel,” 2002).
Argentina’s experience indicates that a fixed exchange
rate can produce disastrous effects upon an economy
in the long run.
VI. Conclusion And Policy Implications
In hindsight, Argentina’s situation clearly il-
lustrates the dangers of relying heavily upon a rigidly
fixed exchange rate for prolonged periods of time.
While a fixed exchange rate can effectively eliminate
hyperinflation, thus promoting economic growth in the
short run, it can create acute economic problems in
the long run.  A fixed exchange rate can decrease a
country’s competitiveness abroad and it relinquishes
control of monetary policy.  Consequently, a fixed
exchange rate compromises a country’s ability to cope
with adverse shocks to the economy.  Argentina’s
downfall was not that it chose to adopt a fixed ex-
change rate in order to combat severe hyperinflation,
but that it failed to modify this policy as the economic
conditions changed.  A fixed exchange rate can serve
as an intermediate step towards economic develop-
ment, but it is not a panacea for irresponsible govern-
ment spending or other fundamental macroeconomic
problems.
Unavoidably, Argentina will have to modify
its monetary policies, including former exchange rate
policies, as well as address more fundamental eco-
nomic problems, such as imprudent government
spending, ineffective tax collection, and inflexible la-
bor markets.  In terms of currency reform, Argentina
has already devalued its peso, though further devalu-
ation appears inevitable.  If Argentina adopts a float-
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ing, market-based currency, it could utilize monetary
policy to help manage the country’s prolonged reces-
sion.  In addition, Argentina’s recent default of $155
billion emphasizes the country’s need for fiscal re-
form.  In order to promote the future economic wel-
fare of Argentina, the country must begin repairing its
reputation and establishing its potential among inves-
tors, banks, and governments.  Perhaps most impor-
tant, Argentine politicians must regain the trust of its
people in both the government and the economy, in
order to achieve economic recovery and eventual
prosperity.  Although Argentina’s economic recovery
will inevitably involve hardship, hope exists for this
country.  According to the World Bank, Argentina’s
productive potential is “unsurpassed in Latin America”
(“Argentina: History in the Making?” 1992).
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